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Abstract— We consider a group of Bayesian agents who try
to estimate a state of the world θ through interaction on a social
network. Each agent v initially receives a private measurement
of θ: a number Sv picked from a Gaussian distribution with
mean θ and standard deviation one. Then, in each discrete time
iteration, each reveals its estimate of θ to its neighbors, and,
observing its neighbors’ actions, updates its belief using Bayes’
Law.
This process aggregates information efficiently, in the sense
that all the agents converge to the belief that they would have,
had they access to all the private measurements. We show that
this process is computationally efficient, so that each agent’s
calculation can be easily carried out. We also show that on
any graph the process converges after at most 2N · D steps,
where N is the number of agents and D is the diameter of
the network. Finally, we show that on trees and on distance
transitive-graphs the process converges after D steps, and that
it preserves privacy, so that agents learn very little about
the private signal of most other agents, despite the efficient
aggregation of information. Our results extend those in an
unpublished manuscript of the first and last authors.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study a model of social learning, in which a group of
Bayesian agents learn a state of the world through repeated
interaction with their social network neighbors1.
Similar models which have been studied in the past can
be roughly divided into two categories: rational models and
rule of thumb models. In rational models (e.g. Gale and
Kariv [2], Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [3], Mossel, Sly
and Tamuz [4], Arieli and Mueller-Frank [5]), agents choose
actions that are optimal under some criterion; usually the
maximization of some expected utility. In rule of thumb
models (e.g. DeGroot [6], Bala and Goyal [7], Golub and
Jackson [8]) they act by some fixed heuristic.
Rational models are more natural and conform to the eco-
nomic paradigm of rational agents, making them amenable
to game theoretical analysis. However, the calculations that
are required of the agents there are usually complicated and
perhaps computationally hard. In this paper we present a
rational model for which, as we show, the agents’ actions
can be calculated efficiently. An essentially identical model
1This work is an extension of an unpublished manuscript by Mossel and
Tamuz [1]
was studied by DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zweibel [9], who,
however, did not consider computational questions.
Beyond computation efficiency we study the speed of
convergence of the learning process. Denoting the number of
agents by N and the diameter of the social network graph by
D, we show that on any graph the process converges after at
most 2N ·D steps. On trees and on distance-transitive graphs
(e.g., the hypercube) we show that the process converges
after D steps; note that D is a lower bound on convergence
time in any graph.
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zweibel [9] show that information
is optimally aggregated by this process: all agents eventually
converge to the same estimate they would have if they shared
all the private signals. We develop a notion of privacy, and
show that despite the fact that information is aggregated, on
some graphs a high degree of privacy is preserved, in the
sense that most pairs of agents know very little about each
other’s private signals.
A. Model
We consider a finite set of Bayesian agents V and denote
N = |V |. The agents are connected by an undirected social
network graph G = (V,E). We assume that the graph is
connected.
The agents are interested in estimate a state of the world
θ ∈ R. Initially, each agent v ∈ V receives a private signal
Sv, drawn from the normal distribution with mean θ and
standard deviation σ. We assume that the different Sv are
independent.
The agents initially have some prior belief regarding θ, and
update it to a posterior belief, according to Bayes’ Law, with
each additional piece of information they encounter. Both
prior and posterior beliefs are distributions on the possible
values of θ. We assume that all agents share a common prior,
the “improper” uniform measure on R. An equivalent model
would let each agent v have a prior equal to the Gaussian
distribution with mean θ and variance one.
At each iteration t, each agent v reveals to its neighbors
the expectation of its current belief Xv(t), and learns theirs.
It then updates its belief, based on this new information:
Xv(t) = E [θ|Sv, {Xw(t′) : (v, w) ∈ E, t′ < t}] .
Note that to perform this calculation each agent has to know
the structure of the graph.
This model is similar to the one presented in [10]. The
agents in that model, however, were not Bayesian and had
no memory of their observations in past iterations.
We note that this model can be trivially generalized to a
much wider class of private signal distributions, provided that
we assume that the agents aim to minimize square error. In
particular, in that case all of our results hold for any private
signal distribution in which the covariances of the private
signals (of each pair of agents) are finite.
II. RESULTS
We prove the following results:
Efficient Computation. Each agent’s calculation of Xv(t)
is computationally efficient: it can be achieved using simple
linear algebra operations, involving matrices whose size is
the size of the network.
Efficient and Rapid Learning. DeMarzo, Vayanos and
Zweibel [9] show that the agents’ posterior beliefs all con-
verge to the same value, E [θ|{Sv}v∈V ]. This is the value
that they would have converged to, had they all access to
each others’ private measurements. We show that the process
converges in at most 2N ·D iterations, where N is the number
of agents and D is the diameter of the graph.
Network Topology and Optimal Convergence. We prove
that certain network topologies permit convergence in D
steps, the fastest possible convergence time. Specifically,
we show that networks whose underlying graph is distance-
transitive (e.g. hypercube graphs and Johnson graphs) or is
a tree have optimal convergence time, largely due to a high
degree of symmetry that can be exploited by each agent when
calculating their estimates.
Privacy. We develop a notion of privacy given each agent’s
information: the privacy between agent v and w is the
variance of v’s best estimate of w’s private signal, at the
end of the process. We derive a simple analytic expression
for privacy, and show that on trees and on distance-transitive
graphs a high degree of privacy is preserved: for most pairs
of agents v and w, v’s estimate of w’s private signal at the
end of the process is not much more precise than it was in
the beginning.
A. Computational efficiency.
We choose a model of computation in which agents
can store real numbers and carry out the basic arithmetic
operations on them. A feature of this computational model
is that it circumvents such issues as numerical stability, for
example in the inversion of ill-conditioned matrices. This
modeling approach makes it easier to construct efficient
algorithms, but is arguably less realistic than a model that
takes these issues into account.
1) The agents’ calculation: Let W be the vector space of
Gaussian random variables spanned by the different Sv’s:
W =
{∑
v∈V
βvSv s.t. ∀v : βv ∈ R
}
. (1)
It is easy to convince oneself that this indeed is a vector
space of finite dimension. Note that all the random variables
in this space are normally distributed. Denote by W1 the
subset of unbiased estimators of θ in W :
W1 =
{∑
v∈V
βvSv ∈ W s.t.
∑
v∈V
βv = 1
}
. (2)
Theorem 2.1: For all agents w and times t, it holds that
Xw(t) ∈ W1, with Xw(t) =
∑
v βwv(t)Sv for some βwv(t).
Proof: We shall prove this by induction on t. At time
t = 0 the claim is true since βwv(0) is one when w = v and
zero otherwise. Assume that the claim is true until time t.
Consider an agent w, and denote by r0, . . . , rk the random
variables that agent w has observed up to time t, with r0 =
Sw = Xw(0). Those are w’s own and its neighbors’ past
estimators. By our assumption these are all in W1, and we
can write ri =
∑
v AivSv = (AS)i, where the coefficients
of the matrix A are a simple re-indexing of the coefficients
βwv(t), by some relation that maps each w and t to some i.
Since by assumption ri ∈ W1 then
∑
v Aiv = 1.
Denote by r the vector (r0, . . . , rn), denote by 1 the vector
(1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn, and denote by Cij the covariance between
ri and rj , so that
C = σ2AAT . (3)
Then r’s distribution is the normal multivariate distribution
with covariance matrix C and mean 1θ (since ri ∈ W1), and
the likelihood of θ given that agent w has observed r is
p(r|θ) = 1
(2pi)
n/2 |C|1/2
e−
1
2 (r−1θ)
TC−1(r−1θ), (4)
where p(·) denotes probabilities in our probability space.
Note that in the case that C is not invertible (equivalently,
r is not linearly independent) we remove from it (and
correspondingly from r) a minimal set of columns and rows
such that it becomes invertible. By corollary, C is never
larger than N ×N .
The expression (r−1θ)TC−1(r−1θ) can be rewritten as
1
TC−11 ·
(
S − 1
T
C
−1
r
1TC−11
)2
+B
with B a normalization factor. Denote
γ =
1
TC−1
1TC−11
, (5)
and note that
∑
i γi = 1.
We can now write
p(r|S) = 1√
2piτ2
e−(θ−x)
2/2τ2 (6)
where
x =
1
TC−1
1TC−11
r =
∑
i
γiri and τ2 =
1
1TC−11
·
(7)
Note that x is a linear combination of the observations that
w made up to time t.
The expected value of the multinormal distribution (6) is x,
and therefore the maximum likelihood estimator is x. Since
the prior is uniform the Bayes estimator is likewise x, and
we have that Xw(t+ 1) = x. Then
Xw(t+ 1) =
∑
i
γi
∑
v
AivSv (8)
and therefore
βwv(t+ 1) =
∑
i
∑
v
γiAiv. (9)
Since
∑
i γi = 1 and
∑
v Aiv = 1 then
∑
v βwv(t+ 1) = 1.
We have shown then that Xw(t + 1) ∈ W1. We have also
shown that to calculate βwv(t+ 1), given the coefficients at
time t, one need only invert N matrices (one for each agent),
of size at most N × N - certainly an efficient calculation.
Furthermore, no knowledge of the Sv’s is needed, but only
of the graph structure.
We write below an algorithm that efficiently calculates all
the vectors γ for all the agents at all time periods. Given this,
an agent can straightforwardly calculate its actions using (7).
We use here the notation introduced in the proof above,
but add to it explicitly the name of the calculating agent and
the time period. Hence Awiv(t) is the Aiv of agent w at time
t, and likewise for C, β,γ and τ .
1) Calculate all βwv(t). At the first time period these are
trivial, as we note above. At later time periods these
are the result of the calculation of the previous time
periods.
2) Calculate all Awiv(t), as described above. This is a
simple renaming of βwv(t).
3) Calculate all Cw(t) by (3).
4) Calculate all γw(t) by (5).
5) Calculate all βwv(t+ 1) by (9).
Theorem 2.2: There exists an efficient algorithm to calcu-
late the agents’ actions.
Proof: To calculate its action at time t+1, an agent w
can run the algorithm above up to time t to calculate γw(t),
and then use (7) to calculate Xw(t + 1). The running time
is dominated by the inversion of the covariance matrices C,
and hence is a small polynomial in n and linear in t.
B. Learning efficiency
1) Convergence in N2: To show that the beliefs of the
agents converge, we need only note that being conditional
probabilities over increasingly large probability spaces, these
beliefs are martingales. Then, because these martingales are
bounded in L2, they converge. However, the following proof,
which does not require the power of martingales, shows that
convergence in fact takes places in at most N2 iterations,
and that furthermore all agents converge to the same belief.
This result is in spirit related to previous martingale results
in social learning such as Aumann’s “Agree to Disagree”
result [11], [12] and the work of Borkar and Varaiya [13].
The proof is similar to the one presented by DeMarzo et al.
[9].
When two neighboring agents have different beliefs, then
at least one of them will learn from the other and improve
its estimator: Assume agents u and v are neighbors with
different estimators, and agent v’s belief has variance lower
than or equal to that of agent u. Then agent v’s estimator
is necessarily not in the space spanned by the estimators
previously seen by u. Hence the dimension spanned by u’s
memory will increase at this iteration. We have thus shown
that in each iteration, unless all the agents have the same
estimator, at least one of them increases the dimension of its
space by at least one. Since the maximum dimension possible
is N then convergence will occur after at most N2 steps, and
all agents will converge to the same belief.
2) Convergence in 2N · D iterations: A slightly more
subtle argument proves a better bound for the convergence
rate, namely 2N ·D, where D is the diameter of the graph.
The idea of the proof is that the current estimator of an
agent u cannot remain unchanged for many steps, unless a
growing neighborhood around u also remains stagnant. The
formal proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3: If some agent’s estimator has not changed for
2D steps then the process has converged.
Proof: Assume agent u’s estimator does not change
from iteration t0 to t0 + 2D, so that
Xu(t0) = Xu(t0 + 1) = · · · = Xu(t0 + 2D).
Denote x := Xu(t0) = · · · = Xu(t0 + 2D), and let U be
the space spanned by the estimators in u’s memory at time
t0 + 2D. Then by definition of the process x is the optimal
unbiased estimator in U .
Let w be a neighbor of u. Then w’s estimator at time
t0 +1, Xw(t0 +1), is in U , since u observes Xw(t0 +1) at
time t0+2. Now x by definition is better than any estimator
in U , and so, since w has observed x at time t0, it must be
that Xw(t0 + 1) = x. By the same argument Xw(t) = x for
t0 + 1 ≤ t ≤ t0 + 2D − 1.
Applying this argument inductively, it follows that at time
t0 + i ≤ t ≤ t0 + 2D− i all the agents at distance i from u
have estimator x, and so at time t0 +D all agents have the
same estimator.
Recalling that at each iteration an agent’s estimator is a
weighted average of those of its neighbors, we conclude that
all nodes will have estimator x for all times t ≥ t0+D. The
proof follows.
Theorem 2.4: The process stops after 2N ·D iterations.
Proof: Every time an agent’s estimator changes, the
dimension of the space the agent’s memory spans increases
by at least one, and so this cannot happen more than N
times. Since This must happen every 2D steps as long as
the process hasn’t converged, the process must stop after
2N ·D iterations.
3) Convergence to the optimum: At any particular itera-
tion, any node v contains Sv in the space of its estimators.
At each iteration the estimator at v is then of the form
aSv + bS where S is an unbiased linear estimator based
on some signals (not including Sv), and a + b = 1. Note
that the variance of this estimator is a2 + b2V ar(S) and
it is minimized when a = V ar(S)/(1 + V ar(S)). Since
S depends on all the signals but Sv its variance is at least
1/(N − 1) and therefore a is at least 1/N .
Hence all the agents, at all iterations, give their own
estimators weight which is at least 1/N . Since they all
converge to the same estimator, and since the sum of the
weights in this estimator must be one (since it, too, is
unbiased), then the weights must all be 1/N , and the limiting
estimator is the simple average of the private measurements,
as stated.
III. DIAMETER CONVERGENCE
We say that two agents v and w have observed each other
at time t if d(v, w) ≤ t. Fundamentally, the fastest possible
convergence time will occur in a number of steps equal to
the diameter D of G. This is because the optimal estimator
requires each agent to average over all of the private signals,
and there must have been t > D steps before the most
distant pair of agents can observe each other. Here we show
that at least two families of graphs achieve this optimal
convergence. We start by proving a general lemma that will
be useful in this analysis.
Lemma 3.1: If each agent’s calculation corresponds to
averaging all the Sw it has observed so far, e.g. all of the
βwv are either equal to 0 if d(v, w) > t and 1m for some
integer m > 0 if d(v, w) ≤ t, then all beliefs converge after
D steps.
Proof: By definition, there exist a pair of agents v and
w between whom d(v, w) = D. This means that, after D
steps, w will observe an action for which βwv > 0, and
vice versa. Since by assumption each agent’s calculation is
an average of the all Sw observed so far, and v and w both
have weights βwv 6= 0, it must be true that v and w will both
have beliefs which have converged (e.g. βwv = 1N ). Since v
and w were the most distant pair of agents, this implies that
all other agents have beliefs that have converged as well.
This lemma allows us to reduce the diameter convergence
proof to simply showing inductively that, if all agents com-
pute uniform averages at step t, then they will also do so at
step t+1. We use this approach to prove that two families for
graphs, trees and hypercubes, converge in precisely D steps.
In general we find that all distance-transitive graphs (e.g.
hypercubes, Johnson Graphs, etc.) have this convergence
property.
Theorem 3.2 (Trees): Beliefs converge in D steps if G is
a tree.
Proof: We start by selecting an arbitrary agent w to be
the root. It is straightforward to see that at t = 1, agent w
simply averages its own observation Sw with those of each
of its children c ∈ Cw . Now assume that, up to time t, each
agent’s current estimator is the average of all the Sv’s it has
had access to so far, e.g.
Xw(t) =
∑
v∈Bi(t)
AwvSv =
1
|Bw(t)|
∑
v∈Bw(t)
Sv,
where Bw(t) is the number of agents within graph distance t
of agent w. This means that, at time t+1, w has access to its
childrens’ observations Xc(t) for c ∈ Cw, as well as all of
its previous observations xw(t′) for t′ ≤ t. We define Gc(t)
to be the subtree of the graph G corresponding to child c up
to depth t. Similarly, let Bc(t) be the set of agents in a ball
of radius t that each child c has observed up to time t.
If we think about what information is encoded in Xc(t),
we know that the agents whose private observations Sv have
non-zero weights in this estimate will be those in Gc(t+1),
agent w itself, and agents in Gc′(t − 1) (with c′ 6= c). This
means that each Xc(t) contains duplicate observations in
Bw(t − 1), and non-overlapping observations of all agents
radius exactly t+1 from w. This means that w can calculate
∑
c∈Cw
|Bc(t)|
|Bw(t+ 1)|
Xc(t)
− (|Cw| − 1)
|Bw(t− 1)|
|Bw(t+ 1)|
Xw(t− 1)
=
1
|Bw(t+ 1)|
∑
v∈Bw(t+1)
Sv. (10)
Since 1|Bw(t+1)|
∑
v∈Bw(t+1)
Sv is the optimal estimate of
all agents that w has observed at time t, it must be true that
Xw(t+ 1) =
1
|Bw(t+ 1)|
∑
v∈Bw(t+1)
Sv.
Since w was an arbitrary agent, these results must hold for
all agents. Since the inductive step holds, we see that each
agent’s calculation corresponds to a uniform average at each
step and by lemma 3.1, beliefs converge in D for the case
of tree graphs.
One straightforward consequence of (10) is that if w is a leaf,
then it simply copies its neighbor at each time step because
|Cw| = 1 and |Bw(t+ 1)| = |Bc(t)|.
Theorem 3.3 (Hypercubes): Beliefs converge in D steps
if G is a hypercube.
Proof: To begin we index agents on an n-dimensional
hypercube with vectors in Fn2 . Edges connect Hamming
distance 1 agents. More generally, the distance of two agents
in the graph is the Hamming distance of their indices. We
proceed inductively in much the same way as the previous
theorem. Without loss of generality, we pick an agent to
index as 0, the vector of all zeros whose belief we denote
as X0. Agent 0’s ith neighbor can then be indexed by δi,
the vectors whose ith entry is 1 and all other entries are 0
whose belief we denote as xδi(t).
Again we see that the base case is simple, as each agent
averages themselves with their neighbors at t = 1. We
assume that, up to time t, each agent’s estimate is the average
of all agents in a ball of radius t around it,
Xw(t) =
1
|Bw(t)|
∑
v∈Bw(t)
Sv, ∀w ∈ Fn2 .
At time t + 1, agent 0 receives beliefs from all n of its
neighbor at time t, Xδi(t). We first note that these beliefs
can be decomposed in the following way,
Xδi(t) =
|B0(t− 1)|
|Bδi(t)|
X0(t− 1)
+
1
|Bδi(t)|
∑
v∈Hδi (t−1)∪Hδi (t)
Sv, (11)
where Hw(t) represents the hull of agents at distance exactly
t from agent w. While in the case of trees we took advantage
of the non-overlapping nature of agents at radius t + 1 in
distinct subtrees, for hypercubes we do not necessarily have
that Hδi(t) ∩Hδj (t) = 0 for i 6= j. This will generally not
be the case after t = 0, so to compute a uniform average
we must make sure that each agent is in exactly the same
number of hulls Hδi(t).
To prove this, we note that agents at radius t + 1 have
indices corresponding precisely to vectors in Fn2 with exactly
t + 1 non-zero entries. From this we know that each agent
at radius t+ 1 will be accounted for in exactly t+ 1 of the
neighbors δi, specifically in every δi corresponding to a non-
zero entry of that agent’s index. The same will be true for
agents at radius t. Using equation (11), we see that
n∑
i=1
|Bδi(t)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
xδi(t) = (n− t)
|B0(t− 1)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
X0(t− 1)
−
|B0(t)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
X0(t)
+
t+ 1
|B0(t+ 1)|
∑
w∈B0(t+1)
Sw.
Rearranging, we have that
1
|B0(t+ 1)|
∑
w∈B0(t+1)
Sw
=
1
t+ 1
(
n∑
i=1
|Bδi(t)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
Xδi(t)
+
|B0(t)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
X0(t)
− (n− t)
|B0(t− 1)|
|B0(t+ 1)|
X0(t− 1)
)
. (12)
Now we can again use lemma 3.1 to prove that, if G is a
hypercube, then the process converges in D steps.
Note that the only property of the hypercube we used in
Theorem 3.3 is that, at time t, estimates from all agents
at a distance t from v show up in an equal number of
neighboring estimates, in this case t of them. More generally,
we can observe the following: Let G be a graph such that
for any vertices u, v, v′ with d(u, v) = d(u, v′) there is
an automorphism that fixes u and swaps v and v′. Then
the process converges in D steps on the graph G. Such an
automorphism exists for all distance-transitive graphs [14].
Definition 3.4: A graph G is distance transitive if, given
any two vertices v and w at any distance i, and any other
two vertices x and y at the same distance, there is an
automorphism of the graph that carries v to x and w to y.
We have thus in fact proved the following, more general
theorem.
Theorem 3.5 (Distance Transitive Graphs): Beliefs con-
verge in D steps if G is a distance transitive graph.
IV. PRIVACY
In this section we define and analyze a notion of privacy.
The question the we ask is: given that the process aggregates
information optimally, so that each agent learns the average
of all the private signals, is it possible that agents do not learn
much beyond that about each others’ signals? We show that
for some graphs this is indeed the case.
Definition 4.1: Let Πwv be the normalized variance of
an agent w’s estimate of another agent v’s private signal.
Formally, Πwv = 1σ2 Varw(Sv|r), where w is the agent
making the estimate and r is the vector of w’s observations
at the time of convergence.
Each element of Π is in the range [0, 1], where Πwv = 0 if
w can exactly compute Sv from its observations and Πwv =
1 when w has not yet observed v. Clearly Πww = 0, since
every agent knows its own private measurement. In addition,
if v is a neighbor of w then Πwv = 0, since each agent
directly observes its neighbors.
Things become more complicated once we start looking at
agents that are at a distance greater than 1. As a motivating
example, we will consider social learning on the star graph
G = K1,3. We denote agent 0 to be at the center of the star
and agents 1, 2 and 3 to be the leaves. At t = 0, agent 1
observes only its private measurement S1, so X1(0) = r =
S1. At time t = 1, Agent 1 receives the estimate X0(0) =
S0 from its only neighbor, so r = [S0, S1] and its estimate
of the world is X1(1) = 12 (S0 + S1). Since agent 0 has
seen everyone’s private measurement at t = 1, its estimate is
X0(1) =
1
4 (S0 + S1 + S2 + S3). At t = 2, agent 1 observes
X0(1) and so they have r = [S0, S1, 14 (S0 +S1+S2+S3)].
Since each agent knows the structure of the graph, agent 1
(along with everyone else) knows that it has just received the
optimal estimate. It now has X1(2) = 14 (S0+S1+S2+S3),
and the process is complete.
From what we have seen, we know that we can rewrite r
at the last step as
r = AS =

1 0 0 00 1 0 0
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4




S0
S1
S2
S3

 . (13)
Intuitively, it seems that the best agent 1 can do is to average
S2 and S3, which can be computed from
2r2 − 1
2
r0 − 1
2
r1 =
1
2
(S2 + S3). (14)
Note that these coefficients can be computed from the right
pseudoiverse of A. With this estimator, the level of privacy
corresponds to
Π12 =
1
σ2
Var
(
S2
∣∣∣1
2
(S2 + S3)
)
=
1
2
.
To formalize this intuition, we recall the covariance matrix
C between the components of r is C = σ2AAT . What we
need to be able to compute then is the covariance between
r and S. If we think of C as a transformation of the
Gaussian vector space spanned by the components of r, the
corresponding transformation in the space spanned by the Sv
is
C′ = A†CA†T ,
where A† = AT (AAT )−1 is the right pseudoinverse of A.
Now we show that the variance of the agent’s estimator is
the error corresponding to the projection from the subspace
spanned by r into the space spanned by S: .
Theorem 4.2: The privacy Π can be computed from the
equation Πwv = diag(I − C′)v .
Proof: we note that the conditional variance of a
multivariate Gaussian is
Var(X1|X2) = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21.
Since we are computing Varw(S|r), we know that
Σ11 = σ
2I, (15)
Σ22 = C = σ
2AAT ,
Σ12 = Σ
T
21 = σ
2AT
Combining these, we have
Varw(S|r) = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21
= σ2I − σ2AT (AAT )−1A
= σ2(I − C′)
From this, the variance of a given estimator is
Πwv =
1
σ2
Varw(S|r)vv = diag(I − C′)v.
Returning to the example above, we have that
I − C′ =


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 12 − 12
0 0 − 12 12

 ,
so the privacy of the estimators is
Πw,0:3 =
[
0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
]
.
Since agent 0 directly observed S0 and S1 and only observed
the average of S2 and S3, this matches precisely what we
would expect.
The next step is to examine how the structure of the graph
and the convergence rate relate to the notion of privacy we
have discussed. One immediate result is that if any agent
has a rank N covariance matrix, then as mentioned earlier
A is full rank and invertible. If A is invertible, then that
agent can directly calculate S = A−1r, and thus there is no
privacy with respect to that agent. This result can also be
seen from the above theorem, as an invertible A tells us that
I −AT (AAT )−1A = I − I = 0.
More generally, we can apply these results to the two
families of graphs studied in the previous sections, trees and
hypercubes.
Theorem 4.3: The privacy between an agent w in a tree
and an agent v at distance k away is Πwv = 1 − 1|Hcw(k)| ,
where Hcw(k) is the set of agents at distance exactly k from
w in the subtree containing v.
Proof: We know from theorem 3.2 that w is able to
compute from its observations the average of all agents in
Hcw(k), the set of agents exactly distance k from w in the
subtree Gc. Since this is the only observation w gets that has
any new information about v. This means that
Πwv = Varw

Sv
∣∣∣∣∣ 1|Hcw(k)|
∑
v′∈Hcw(k)
Sv′


= 1− 1|Hcw(k)|
.
For the special case of balanced m-ary trees, we see that the
privacy between the root agent and any agent at depth k is
precisely Varw(Sv|r) = σ2(1− 1mk−1 ).
Theorem 4.4: If G is a hypercube, then the privacy be-
tween agents at distance k apart is Πwv = 1− n(nk) .
Proof: We note that that, for an n-dimensional hyper-
cube, v has precisely
(
n
k
)
agents at distance k away. We
also know that, at step k, v received n linearly independent
observations from its neighbors that contain information
about averages over subset of neighbors at distance k. From
theorem 3.3 we know we can isolate just the terms
|Bv(t)|
|Hv(t)|
xv(t)−
|Bv(t− 1)|
|Hv(t)|
xv(t− 1) =
1
|Hv(t)|
∑
w∈Hv(t)
Sw
Now let A be the matrix whose rows only contain coefficients
from these equations. From this, we can compute
Tr(I − AT (AAT )−1A) = Tr(I)− Tr(AT (AAT )−1A)
=
(
n
k
)
− Tr(AAT (AAT )−1)
=
(
n
k
)
− n.
By symmetry, we observe that the privacy between an agent
w and any agent v at distance k on the hypercube must be
the same for all v. Since there are
(
n
k
)
agents at distance k,
we know that
Πwv =
1(
n
k
)Tr(I −AT (AAT )−1A) = 1− n(n
k
) .
This theorem demonstrates an interesting privacy pattern
on this graph: privacy is zero for neighbors, is maximized
near the middle of the graph (i.e., where k = [n2 ]) and goes
back down to zero for nodes of the other side of the graph
(i.e., where k = n). This result also generalizes to distance
transitive graphs. If d(w, v) = k, then we will have privacy
equal to
Πwv = 1− Hw(1)
Hw(k)
,
i.e. one minus the ratio of the number of neighbors of w to
the number of agents at distance k from w.
V. FOLLOW-UP WORK AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
Since the first version of this paper [1] appeared online,
it has influenced a number of other studies (see., e.g., [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21]), some of which are direct
generalizations of this work. We discuss some of these and
other possible research directions below.
A property of this model that DeMarzo et al. found unre-
alistic is the requirement that all agents know the structure
of the social network. While indeed this may be difficult
to justify for some large networks, it is perhaps not strictly
necessary; in order to perform their calculations, the agents
need to know the covariance between the estimators of their
neighbors only. In our model, they derive this knowledge
from the structure of the graph, but in principle it may be de-
rived by other means. This observation (which was clarified
in discussions with Rafael M. Frongillo, Grant Schoenebeck
and Adam Kalai, whom we would like to thank) presents an
opportunity for follow-up work involving some variant of this
model, which does not require knowledge of the network, but
still preserves rationality, tractability and efficient learning.
Another promising direction is to consider the case that the
state of the world is not constant but changes stochastically
as the agents try to estimate it. This is pursued in [18], for
the case of the complete network.
A further natural generalization is the consideration of
more complicated utilities. For example, each agent’s utility
could depend also on the actions of others. This is pursued
in [20].
Not much need be changed in this model to make the
agents strategic. For example, consider a model that is
identical to ours, except that agents are no longer myopic, but
take an action that optimizes their expected future discounted
gains (i.e. the expectation of their averaged future gains, with
exponentially decreasing weights). Agents will now take into
account the impact of their actions on their peers, and so it
seems plausible that strategic behavior will emerge, and in
fact this is proved for similar models in [22]. Their work
leads us to conjecture that this modified non-myopic model
may feature strategic interactions on social networks with
tractable calculations. No other such example is known - to
the best of our knowledge.
The results established in this paper show convergence in
O(N ·D). A natural question is whether this bound can be
improved. Certainly, convergence cannot happen faster than
O(D) - the time it takes information to propagate through the
network. For binary trees, where the diameter is O(logN),
convergence does happen in O(D), as it does for cliques and
distance-transitive graphs. However, simulations have led us
to believe that convergence in general is not that fast, and
requires - we conjecture - O(N) steps.
In our simulations we sampled a population of d-regular
graphs for a wide range of d. The result always converges
in N/d steps, with every agent increasing the dimension
of the space its memory spanned by d, at every iteration.
This may hint that convergence time may, in some sense, be
inversely proportional to the degrees of the graph vertices.
Additionally we find that distance-transitive graphs (which
converged in O(D)) converge in O(N/d) when a few pairs
of edges are randomly swapped. This means that a highly
symmetric graph will behave as though it were completely
randomized under mild perturbations (usually two or three
swaps will suffice). We thus conclude with the following
conjecture and open problem:
Conjecture 5.1: For any graph the learning process con-
verges in O(N) iterations.
Open Problem 5.2: Does the process converge in
O(N/d∗) iterations for all graphs, where d∗ is the minimal
degree of the graph?
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